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What makes for a high-quality educational or psychological test? The standard answer is that 
it must have good reliability and validity (e.g., Clausen-May, 2001). Reliability, the degree to 
which a test generates consistent results, can be fairly straightforward to document, but 
validity is much more complicated, as well as being of far greater importance (Black & 
Wiliam, 2014). Unless a test captures something that we are interested in concerning those 
who take it, any reliability it may have is of little value. So it is natural to see validity as the 
supreme criterion for evaluating the quality of an assessment, and hence the importance of 
the topic addressed by this helpful and timely book. 
 
In this book, Newton and Shaw bring their considerable knowledge and experience to bear on 
the highly-contested nature of validity in assessments. The relevant literature is huge and can 
be intimidating for the non-expert, who may find important pieces of writing impenetrable. 
The authors see the book not as a “how to” guide to validation but as more of a “how to 
understand” guide to validity and validation. They assume little prior knowledge and take a 
broadly historical approach, painstakingly charting how conceptions of validity have 
developed from the mid-1800s to the present day. It is interesting to note that their account 
features few advances in techniques for validation – most of the procedures that we rely on 
today existed in some form before the 1950s. Instead, the authors’ focus is on the changes in 
thinking concerning what it means to claim validity and how a validity claim may be 
substantiated. 
 
The book is written very clearly and the reader is led with great care through the details of the 
story. The authors do not shy away from the complexities of the debates encountered, 
commenting that “anyone who wants to grapple with validity theory must grapple with some 
extremely thorny issues in the philosophies of science, measurement and mind” (p. 164). This 
makes the book at times a demanding read, but very worthwhile and something which 
everyone serious about assessment should engage with. 
 
The validity of a test is usually defined as the extent to which it measures what it is supposed 
to measure. To take a simple example, a reading test printed in a very small font size would 
be likely to be measuring eyesight to some extent rather than solely the literacy that it was 
constructed to assess. It would be possible for someone to fail the test situation rather than 
the intended test subject of reading, and this would therefore constitute an example of weak 
validity. However, this simple example immediately raises an issue returned to throughout 
the book – that validity depends on the purpose for which a test is constructed or used. 
Optometrists do use reading of text in small font sizes to assess eyesight, so this same test 
might have good validity if used for a different purpose. For the optometrist, the test would 
have poor validity for someone who was not a fluent reader. So it seems to make more sense 
to see validity as a property of an interpretation or a use of a test, rather than of the test itself. 
 
Validity of assessments has been a much discussed issue, and over the years there has been a 
huge proliferation in the different varieties of validity suggested and debated. The authors 
provide a table (p. 8) containing 151 different kinds of validity that have been proposed since 
the 1940s, many of which are synonymous, or nearly so, and they comment that various other 
kinds still continue to be offered today. (Academics can sometimes be good at renaming 
minor variations of familiar concepts in ways sufficiently obscure to avoid accusations of 
plagiarism!) It is to the authors’ credit that they avoid getting bogged down in the minutiae of 
this and manage instead to lead the reader through the entire book mainly by reference to just 
three categories of validity: content validity, criterion validity and construct validity. Content 
validity concerns the inclusion within a test of all relevant aspects of a construct (and may be 
seen as a more rigorous version of face validity). Criterion validity concerns how the measure 
compares with other measures, and is often further divided into predictive validity (where the 
comparison is with something that is assessed at a later time) and concurrent validity (where 
the comparison is with something that is assessed at the same time). Finally, construct 
validity concerns the extent to which a test measures the intended construct. The non-expert 
might well think that this is just another way of saying that it measures what it is supposed to 
measure, and this is indeed a position taken by some (e.g., Bramley, 2012). Certainly, of 
these three kinds of validity, construct validity is the most disputed and hardest to pin down, 
as it relates to what theories say about what a measure would be expected to look like. 
 
To a large extent, the story of this book is a tale of three validities. The authors recount how 
the concept of validity was fragmented into content validity, criterion validity and construct 
validity – the so-called trinitarian conception of validity – and then how one of these parts 
(construct validity) swallowed up the other two so that everything became construct validity. 
Because of this convergence into construct validity, there can be confusion now when 
someone speaks of construct validity, as it may not be clear whether they are referring to it as 
one part of the trinitarian package or as the generalised version encompassing all of validity. 
 
After charting the early years from the mid-1800s, the authors describe the two basic 
approaches to establishing validity that were prevalent in the early twentieth century: logical 
analysis of test content (a forerunner of content validity) and empirical correlation evidence 
(which would later be classed as criterion validity). Lee Cronbach (famous for being the 
originator of Cronbach’s alpha) described these different forms of validity and drew a clear 
distinction between measurement and prediction, taking the view that for the purposes of 
prediction it did not matter what a test measured provided that it predicted something well 
enough for some practical purpose. He was primarily interested in the process of validation 
rather than the theory of validity, and it was he, together with Paul Meehl, who most 
famously elaborated the notion of construct validity. In this way, from the mid-1950s the 
traditional trinitarian conception of validity as content validity – criterion validity – construct 
validity began to emerge. 
 The authors then relate how in the mid-1970s, and principally as a result of the work of 
Samuel Messick, it began to be increasingly acknowledged that content validity and criterion 
validity were over-simplistic and by themselves insufficient. Verifying that the content of a 
test adequately sampled the content of its domain said nothing about whether it would elicit 
the responses that it should from those being tested. Similarly, for criterion validity, a good 
correlation between a predictor measure and a criterion measure did not mean that we 
necessarily knew what, if anything, the predictor was measuring. The authors report how 
Raymond Cattell had been highly dismissive of validating tests by correlation with previous 
tests, a practice which he had referred to as “holy apostolic succession” (p. 49). Cronbach’s 
early view (c. 1949), as we have seen, was that this did not matter if the predictor predicted 
well, but this was less true of his later writings. In this respect, Cronbach was a forerunner of 
Messick, who “dismissed the legitimacy of blindly empiricist approaches to test 
development” (p. 107). Messick presented his ideas as a progressive matrix, consisting of 
four cells, relating to the test’s interpretation and its use, on the one hand, and the evidential 
and consequential bases on the other. Messick included ethics at the centre of validity theory, 
with a concern for the human consequences of tests, seeing such consequential validity as a 
central part of the process. But his progressive matrix was difficult to understand and the 
authors regard this work as confusing and ultimately a mistake. However, over time, under 
Messick’s influence, the trinitarian view of validity gave way to a unitarian perspective, as 
content validity and criterion validity became subsumed within construct validity as the 
single overarching kind of validity. In this way, construct validity moved from being the last 
resort, when neither content validation nor criterion validation was adequate, to becoming the 
overriding category of validity. By 1999 and the fifth edition of the authoritative Standards 
(AERA et al., 1999), there was a huge consensus in favour of Messick’s unified conception 
of validity. 
 
Bringing the story up to the present, the authors argue that in a sense we are “all construct 
validity theorists now” (p. 171), although that does not mean that the disagreements have 
ceased. Since 1999, scholars have increasingly questioned whether the notion of construct 
validity can bear the weight being placed on it, and various attempts have been made to 
simplify the approach. In particular, where Cronbach and Messick might be characterised as 
idealistic, Michael Kane’s approach is pragmatic. Kane takes an argument-based approach to 
validation, seeing it as a rhetorical process which he has likened to building a bridge over a 
river from the test performance on one bank to the claim that it represents a particular level of 
some attribute on the other (p. 139). 
 
The authors see “no signs that debate over the scope of validity is likely to be resolved one 
way or the other in the near future” (p. 178). They conclude the book by focusing on the 
relationships between the various dimensions of evaluation of testing policy and by providing 
a new framework for this, which they present as a reinterpretation of Messick’s original 
progressive matrix. Their reworking consists of seven interdependent questions covering both 
technical evaluation and social evaluation across measurement, decision-making and policy 
objectives. For example, one of their questions is: “Is it acceptable to implement (or continue 
implementing) the testing policy?” (p. 186). They avoid labelling any of their cells as 
“validity”, preferring instead to see the framework holistically. They offer a detailed 
explanation and defence of the details of their proposal, and it remains to be seen in what 
ways it will be taken up and adopted and adapted further. 
 
Approaching this fascinating account of the discussions and debates in validity and validation 
from the current mathematics education context is sobering. It is well-known that poorly-
conceived high-stakes tests can have a devastating backwash effect on teaching and learning 
in classrooms (Berliner, 2011). Teachers are under immense pressure to prioritise classroom 
activities that match closely the kinds of items that will be in the test, and this raises a serious 
issue of consequential validity. As the working party of the International Society for Design 
and Development in Education (Black et al., 2012) put it: 
Driven by pressures for low cost, simplicity of grading and task predictability, current 
tests have a narrow range of item types that does not reflect the breadth of world-class 
learning goals as set out, for example, in the Common Core State Standards for 
Mathematics ... Good tests combine valid and reliable information for accountability 
purposes with a beneficial influence on teaching and learning in classrooms – i.e. they 
are tests worth teaching to. 
Black et al. suggested that the key to validity is to “assess the things that you are really 
interested in” – for example, solving substantial mathematical problems – rather than things 
that might appear easier to assess reliably. Daro and Burkhardt (2012) advocated 
psychometric test design by taking a structured sample from a population consisting of a 
large bank of rich mathematical tasks which could be ranked in difficulty by trialling. They 
suggested publishing the population of tasks along with the balancing algorithm for 
constructing tests from it. 
 
Currently, with the predictable routine items which tend to dominate most high-stakes 
assessments, “teaching to the test” may largely undermine claims to validity (Foster, 2013). 
The US National Research Council (2001) highlighted the compromises that arise when a 
single assessment is used for multiple purposes and complained that the aspects of learning 
targeted by large-scale assessments are often out of line with those advocated for use in the 
classroom. They commented that much more time, money and effort goes into large-scale 
assessments of individuals and programmes than into classroom assessment designed to assist 
learning and urged that “investment must be shifted toward the classroom, where teaching 
and learning occur” (p. 9). Investing in high-quality assessment, which samples from a more 
authentic problem-solving content domain, could potentially be a lever to elevate the 
experiences that students are offered in mathematics classrooms. In a context of escalating 
emphasis on high-stakes assessment, it is crucial that the implications of assessment are 
carefully weighed up, so that assessment becomes a way to support positive change in 
students’ learning of mathematics rather than something that schools and teachers have to 
continually battle against. 
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